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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE
 P R OCEEDINGS 
PeUtmritii appealed film," ilr Iim I i niiil's 'iijmiimi iismiss<H I Ins stvnml pelilmn lint' 
post-conviction relief challenging revocation of probation for his convictions for two counts 
of Sexual Abuse of a Child, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 
* •**.-+ (Supp. 1990) I his Court granted'certiorari review' folio wing the t JtahCoi n I: 
tTirmance of the dismissal by the district court. The court of appeals had 
jurisdiction under § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (2001). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(l)(2001)and§78-2a-4(iy%> 
ISSUES ON APPEAI , AND S I \ NDAR D* OF REVIEW 
Issue I: When a petition for post-conviction relief is summarily dismissed, without 
being served on the State or requesting an answer from the State, may this court determine 
whether petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief, or only whether the lower court erred 
in summarily dismissing the petition? 
Standard of Review: This question was not specifically addressed below, therefore 
no standard of review applies. 
Issue II: Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly determine that the district court 
properly summarily dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief? 
Standard of Review: On a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals, not the district court, and applies the same standard of review used by the 
court of appeals. Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, f 8, 27 P.3d 538, 540. 
When reviewing an appeal from an order granting or denying post-conviction relief, 
the appellate court reviews the lower court's conclusions of law for correctness and its 
findings of fact for clear error. Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61, f 8, 52 P.3d 1168, 1170. See 
also Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 WL 1728629,2002 UT , J 7, P.3d ; Rudolph v. 
Galetka, 2002 UT 7, f 4,43 P.3d 467,468; Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah 
App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal: 
Addendum A - Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C 
Addendum B-Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-101 through 
§ 78.35a.110 (1996) 
2 
S' I \TEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 16, 1991, petitioner was charged with one count of Aggravated Sexual 
Abuse of a Child, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404,, 1 (1 )(Supp. 1990), a first-degree 
1990), second degree felonies (R. 07-08). 
On July 7, 1992, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of Sexual Abuse of a Child (R. 
10- 15, 18- 31) Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than one nor 
nun i I I in in mi in I in I tr rn , car mi hnlli ininili In iiiiiii concurrent! 
imposition of the prison terms was stayed and petitioner was placed on probation for a period 
of thirty-six months under certain conditions, including that he enter into and successfully 
comp 
Less than two years later, in April 1994, a motion for order to show cause why 
probation should not be revoked was filed (R. 37). The district court entered a show cause 
order, and the show cause hearing was scheduled for July 6, 199 ! I (R 1 2) Petitioner v, as 
served with the order to show cause on June 1,1994 (R. 44). Petitioner did not appear at the 
hearing on July 6th. However, petitioner was represented by counsel who advised the court 
that petitioner had contacted him from New York and indicated that he could not afford 
counsel (R 46) Thv i MM I appointed count represent petitioner" rescheduled the 
hearing for September 7,1994 
At the hearing on September 7, petitioner was again not present in person. However, 
counsel tor pditmnn JMIVII1,! I itir" i ml llliii.il In; hcllun ml pditiotia oulil pio\n1i' piool thut 
3 
he was back in therapy. He therefore requested a continuance (R. 48). The matter was 
continued to September 26th. Id. At the hearing on September 26,1994, petitioner was again 
not present, but was represented by counsel (R. 51). The court found that petitioner had not 
completed counseling as required, and he was therefore in violation of his probation (R. 56). 
The court ordered that probation would be revoked unless petitioner was enrolled in an 
appropriate counseling program by October 11th, and provided evidence to his counsel that 
he was enrolled (R. 56). If petitioner was not enrolled in counseling by October 11, 1994, 
then he would have to come back to Utah and report to the Utah state prison (R. 54).1 
In December of 1994, an affidavit in support of a motion for warrant of arrest was 
filed, alleging that petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his probation (R. 65-
66). An arrest warrant was signed on December 20 (R. 68). On February 8, 1995, a new 
arrest warrant was signed (R. 70). Petitioner was eventually arrested on the Utah warrant 
when he was arrested in New York for a DUI (R. 153,163). 
Petitioner appeared before the Utah district court on July 16,1996 (R. 90). A public 
defender was appointed to represent petitioner and the show cause hearing was scheduled 
for August 20, 1996 (R. 90). 
1
 Petitioner asserts in his statement of facts that he "did enroll at the Share 
Program and mailed, at Mr. Harrison's instruction, proof of that enrollment directly to the 
Seventh District Court Clerk. Unfortunately, the court apparently never received it or 
when it received the proof, did not know where to file or record the information." (Brief 
of pet. at 7). Petitioner cites to no record support for this assertion. The state therefore 
asks that the Court strike this unsupported assertion. 
4 
A . i: iclri litted tl lat he v iolated probation by 
failing to successfully complete sex offender therapy as required (R. 93). Petitioner also 
admitted that he violated probation by failing to report to his probation officer in the state of 
New V ork since September of 1994 (R 95-96);" At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge 
fbi ind that petitioner had violated the terms if his pi obation and ordered that he be sent tc •• 
the Utah State Prison to serve the original sentence (R. 165, 168, 170-171). 
Following the revocation hearing, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. (R 101 102) 
"l in 1 )c trim lit "in 0 I OOd llin i|i|iiiMl Mi.jr» IJIMTHS srd tor I inline lu filr I ilmm keting italniM nil I Ik 
106). However, petitioner was advised that if the docketing statement was submitted within 
ten days the appeal would be reinstated. Id. Apparently no docketing statement was ever 
filed because the appeal was not reinstated. The Remittitur was issued on January 23, 199 7 
(case # 960726-CA) (R. 104).3 
Petitioner filed his first state petition for post-conviction relief on January 22, 1997 
(R 123-132) On August 1, 1997, the district court entered an order which concluded that 
# 970700008 (R. 193) (addendum D). 
Petitioner had failed to report to his probation officer since September of 1994 
The first show cause hearing in Utah concerning probation violations was held on 
September 26,1994. | 
3
 The notice of appeal appears to be untimely. The district court Order was filed 
on August 22, 1996 (R. 171 and addendum C). The notice of appeal is dated October 18, 
1996, but was not filed in Seventh District Court until November 4, 1996, and in the Utah 
Court of \ppeals on November 12, 1996 (R. 101). 
5 
Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his first petition for post-conviction relief (R. 
196). On January 23, 1998, the Utah Court of Appeals entered a memorandum decision 
which affirmed the dismissal of the first post-conviction petition - case # 970479-CA (R. 
226-227) (addendum E). A petition for rehearing was denied on March 23, 1998 (R. 250-
251)(addendum F). Petitioner apparently did not file any petition for writ of certiorari. 
On November 11,1999, petitioner filed a petition for extraordinary relief directly in 
the Utah Supreme Court (R. 316). On December 1,1999, pursuant to Rule 20(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court ordered that the petition be "transferred to the 
Seventh Judicial District Court for post-conviction proceedings under Rule 65(c) [sic] of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure/' (R. 374) (addendum G). 
Petitioner's second state petition for post-conviction relief was therefore filed in 
Seventh District Court on December 7,1999 - case #990700187 (R. 374). The state was not 
asked to file any answer or response to this second petition and was therefore not a party to 
this action. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(l) & (h). On October 20, 2000, the district court 
entered a memorandum decision and order which summarily dismissed the second petition 
(R. 433-435) (addendum H). 
Petitioner timely filed a notice to appeal the district court's dismissal of his second 
state petition for post-conviction relief. Since the State was not a party below, it was also not 
a party to this appeal, and did not file any brief or appear in the appellate case. On March 
22,2001, the court of appeals entered a memorandum decision which affirmed the dismissal 
6 
of the second petition - case # 20000994-CA (addendum I). On August 8, 2001, this Court 
granted a petition for writ of certiorari - case # 20010419 (addendum J). 
Although the state was not a party below, and did not respond at the district court or 
appellate court level concerning dismissal of the second petition, in an order dated January 
28, 2002, this Court requested that the State participate and file a brief in response 
(addendum K). In addition, this Court appointed counsel to represent petitioner. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue of whether petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief is not before this 
Court. The only issue before this Court is whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed 
the district court's summary dismissal of petitioner's second petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
The district court properly denied and summarily dismissed petitioner's second 
petition for post-conviction relief because the claims had already been raised or could have 
been raised in his previous petition. The petition was also properly summarily dismissed 
because it was frivolous on its face. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ONLY ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT IS WHETHER THE COURT OF 
APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S SECOND PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF. 
In his brief, petitioner argues the merits of his underlying claims, as if this Court 
should decide the merits of those issues. However, the merits of the underlying claims in the 
7 
second petition were not addressed by the district court because the petition was summarily 
dismissed. That dismissal was affirmed by the court of appeals. On a writ of certiorari, this 
Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals. Clark v Clark, 2001 UT 44, f 8,27 P.3d 
538, 540. If this Court determines that the court of appeals decision was in error, it should 
remand the case to the district court for appropriate proceedings under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See: Moench v. State, 
2002 UT App 333 (trial court erred in finding petition frivolous - reversed and remanded, 
directing trial court to order the Attorney General to file a response); Seel v. Van Der Veur, 
971 P.2d 924 (Utah 1998) (remanded for further proceedings consistent with rule 65B). 
Rule 65C provides that a petition shall be assigned to the judge who sentenced the 
petitioner. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(f). Thejudge must review the petition. Ifit is apparent that 
the claim has already been adjudicated, or if the claim is frivolous, then the court "shall 
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim" Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(l). In this case, the 
district court judge summarily dismissed the petition (R. 433-43 5)(addendum H). 
If the court concludes that a petition should not be summarily dismissed, the district 
court must "designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk 
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent. 
If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of 
Utah represented by the Attorney General." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(h). The respondent has 
thirty (30) days after service of the petition in which to file an answer or other response. 
Utah R Civ P 65C(i). 
8 
In this case, because the petition was summarily dismissed, the State was not served 
with the petition, and was not given an opportunity to answer or respond to the issue of 
whether petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief in his second petition. 
If the case were remanded, the district court would enter its ruling only after allowing 
the State to file an answer or other response, and after holding evidentiary hearings and/or 
oral arguments, if necessary. Once a ruling was entered, the petitioner would have an 
opportunity to appeal the district court decision. If the district court decided the issues on 
the merits, then the court of appeals would review the district court's rulings on the merits. 
Since there was no ruling on the merits, and the State was not given the opportunity 
to respond at the district court or appellate court level, the issue of whether petitioner's 
claims would justify post-conviction relief is not before this Court. 
If this Court determines that the court of appeals erroneously affirmed the summary 
dismissal of the second petition, the case should be remanded to the district court, and the 
State should be given the opportunity to respond to the petition at the district court level, as 
required by Rule 65C. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S SECOND PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF. 
A. The district court properiy summarily dismissed the second 
petition because the issues were previously raised and addressed, 
or could have been raised, in the first petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) governs this petition. This Court recently 
9 
held that %4[t]he PCRA replaced prior post-conviction remedies with a statutory, 'substantive 
legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense 
and who has exhausted all other legal remedies.' Id. § 78-35a-102." Julian v. State, 2002 UT 
61, f 4,52 P.3d 1168. 
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, a petitioner is not eligible for post-
conviction relief if the claims asserted in a second petition were "raised or addressed in any 
previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but [were] not, raised in a 
previous request forpost-conviction relief." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-106(1 )(d) (addendum 
B).4 
4
 Prior to the PCRA, court rules and case law governed post-conviction remedies. 
The pre-Act law permitted merits review of a claim first raised in a successive petition 
only if a petitioner could establish ugood cause" for omitting it from prior petitions. This 
Court recognized that "raising issues in a subsequent habeas corpus petition that were not 
but could have been raised in a previous habeas petition constitutes an abuse of the writ 
and requires dismissal of the petition except where good cause is shown." Monson v. 
State, 953 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1998). This Court also declared that all claims seeking post-
conviction relief should be raised in a single petition. See Andrews v. Shulsen, 113 P.2d 
832, 833-34 (Utah 1988) (raising issues in a petition that were not but could have been 
raised in a previous petition, except where good cause is show, constitutes an abuse of the 
writ and requires dismissal of the petition). Accord, Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1037 
(Utah 1989). See also; Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608,613 (Utah 1994); Wright v. 
Carver, 886 P.2d 58, 60-61 (Utah 1994). 
In Hurst, the court identified examples of the requisite "good cause:" 1) denial of a 
constitutional right under retroactive new law; 2) previously unknown facts that might 
change the trial's outcome; 3) fundamental unfairness in the conviction; 4) imposition of 
an illegal sentence; and 5) "a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay." 
//wrs/,777P.2datl037. 
By its clear language, the PCRA necessarily incorporates the first Hurst exception: 
a claim based on new, retroactive law could not have been raised in a prior petition. The 
PCRA also contemplates the second exception to the extent that it allows relief for 
evidence that meets the statutory definition of "newly discovered evidence." Utah Code 
10 
This was petitioner's second state petition for post-conviction relief In his brief, 
petitioner ignores the fact that this was his second petition. But this fact is crucial as to why 
summary dismissal was appropriate. All of the issues petitioner attempted to raise in his 
second petition had previously been raised, (or could have been raised), in his prior petition 
for post-conviction relief. The district court found that the claims petitioner attempted to 
raise in his second petition had previously been "dealt with by the Appellate Court as well 
as the Trial Court" (R. 434) (addendum H). It therefore properly summarily dismissed the 
petition. 
Upon review of the district court's dismissal of the second petition, the court of 
appeals held that: 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to 
-110 (1996), is dispositive. Section 78-35a-106(1) precludes relief on any 
ground that was "raised or addressed ... on appeal" or "could have been but 
was not raised on appeal" or "was raised or addressed in any previous request 
for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not raised in a previous 
request for post-conviction relief." 
Hutchings v. State, 2001 UT App 95 (unpublished) (addendum I), 
The court of appeals then specifically held that the claims petitioner "raised in his 
second petition were either raised and addressed, or could have been raised, in either the 
direct appeal from the probation revocation, the first petition for post-conviction relief, or the 
Ann, § 78-35a- 104(e). However, the clear language of the PCRA prohibits excusing a 
procedural default on any of the remaining Hurst exceptions. (Of course, Utah law 
provides an alternative remedy for correcting an illegal sentence. Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(e)). 
U 
appeal from dismissal of that petition." Id. The court of appeals found that given the 
preclusive effect of section 78-3 5a-106, the petitioner "may not continue to obtain review of 
claims that were either raised or could have been raised on direct appeal or in previous post-
conviction proceedings and the appeal therefrom."5 Id. 
Under the statutory guidelines of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, the district court 
properly summarily dismissed petitioner's second petition for post-conviction relief. The 
court of appeals properly affirmed that dismissal. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
decision by the court of appeals. 
B. The district court also properly dismissed the petition because it 
was frivolous. 
Summary dismissal of the second petition was appropriate because the issues raised 
had previously been raised, or could have been raised in the prior petition. This alone was 
a sufficient and proper basis for summary dismissal. However, in addition, the district court 
also found that the petition was frivolous. 
Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when a petition for post-
conviction relief is filed, "[t]he assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent 
5
 The court of appeals included the fact that the claims raised in the second 
petition could have been raised in the direct appeal from the probation revocation. The 
PCRA provides that a person is not eligible for post-conviction relief upon any ground 
that "was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal" or that "could have been but was not 
raised at trial or on appeal" Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l). However, whether the 
issues could have been raised in a direct appeal is an irrelevant inquiry when a second 
petition is filed. The inquiry as to what could have been raised in a direct appeal is only 
relevant as to the first state petition for post-conviction relief. 
12 
to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the 
petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the 
claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its 
face The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(l) (addendum A). 
The rule defines a frivolous petition as follows: 
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the 
allegations contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of 
law; 
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(2) (addendum A). 
In his second petition, the petitioner alleged numerous claims, many of which raised 
procedural issues concerning prior revocation hearings. However, the record establishes the 
clear fact that petitioner eventually appeared in person at a revocation hearing where he 
admitted on the record in open court that he had violated the terms of his probation (R. 93-
96). The facts alleged by the petitioner in his second petition were either cured by 
subsequent events, were immaterial, or were not supported by the record. Pursuant to Rule 
65C, the district court properly summarily dismissed petitioner's second petition because it 
was frivolous. 
In his second petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleged that: 
1. the "trial court's issuance of an order for the automatic revocation of the petitioners 
probation was in error as the petitioner had never waived his right to be present... 
13 
Nor did he through his Attorney admit any allegations" (R. 326); 
"the order issued by the trial court for the Automatic Revocation of Probation is in 
standing effect as it has never been Vacated or Ordered set Aside" (R. 326); 
"the city court for Ithaca New York . . Exonerated the Petitioner of the charge of 
Violation of Probation by Disposing of the Charges and convicting on the charge of 
unlicensed operation 3rd in Satisfaction of all Charges" (R. 327-28); 
"The delay from the 15th day of May 1995 to the revocation hearing held on the 20th 
day of August 1996 . . . does prejudice the petitioner" (R. 330); 
"the Emory County Attorney raised allegations not mentioned in the Order to Show 
Cause... Specifically the allegation that alleged the petitioner failed to report to his 
Probation Officer during the time of 'Fictional Supervision"' (R. 33 l)(emphasis in 
original); 
"counsel was and is ineffective because he was not the counsel appointed by the trial 
court at the hearing held the 6th day of July 1994" (R. 331); 
"the court has inappropriately and illegally imposed a sentence of five (5) years to life 
and done so 'behind closed doors' by its order to show cause and to commit to the 
Utah state prison" (R. 332)(emphasis in original); 
"The trial court erred in its order on the petitioners petition for post-conviction relief 
in that the court failed to appoint counsel and set the matter for an evidentiary 
hearing" (R. 334). 
14 
In its memorandum decision dismissing the second petition, the district court noted 
that it had reviewed the petition, the entry of the plea, and the admissions of probation 
violations (addendum H). The Court found that the petitioner was present in person at the 
revocation hearing. The petitioner was represented by counsel David Allred, who was a legal 
defender for Emery County, and who was appointed to represent the petitioner in the Show 
Cause proceedings. The court also specifically noted that the probation violation hearing was 
held in open court (R. 433) (addendum H). 
At the hearing, the petitioner admitted violating the terms of his probation. The 
district court specifically found that "[t]here is no question that the petitioner had, in fact, 
violated the terms of his probation, had failed to report, and had not successfully completed 
the sexual abuse counseling" (R. 433). Therefore, petitioner's probation was revoked and 
he was sentenced to the Utah State Prison under the terms of the original judgment (R. 433-
34) (addendum H). 
Based on the district court findings, it is clear that the issues raised by petitioner were 
frivolous. For example, petitioner alleged that he never waived his right to be present at the 
revocation hearing and did not, through his attorney, admit any allegations. Although 
petitioner was not present for earlier proceedings, the district court specifically found that the 
petitioner was present in person at the revocation hearing, where he admitted violating 
probation. Another example is that petitioner alleged that the hearing occurred "behind 
closed doors." The district court specifically found that the hearing was held in open court. 
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Based on its knowledge of the case, and its review of the petition, entry of the plea, 
and the probation revocation hearing, the district court properly summarily dismissed the 
second petition because it was frivolous. The facts alleged in the petition either did not 
support a claim for post-conviction relief as a matter of law, or the claims had no arguable 
basis in fact. 
C. The district court properly dismissed the second petition without 
holding a hearing or appointing counsel. 
Petitioner alleges that the district court erred in dismissing the petition without a 
hearing and without appointing counsel. In his brief, petitioner asserts that "the trial court 
found on the record that Mr. Hutchings' post-conviction petition merited both the 
appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing." (Brief of pet. at 14). However, 
petitioner is apparently referring to statements made by the court at a hearing concerning the 
first petition for post-conviction relief (case # 970700008), held on January 22, 1997. (R. 
143-144). The district court did not hold that petitioner's second petition for post-conviction 
relief (case # 990700187) merited appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing.6 
The post-conviction rules clearly provide for summary dismissal of a petition. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65C(g) (addendum A). Obviously no hearing is required when a petition is 
summarily dismissed. Even if a petition is not summarily dismissed, a hearing is not always 
6
 Even if a court originally thought a petitioner was entitled to a hearing and to 
appointment of counsel, after a review of the law and the facts of a particular case, a court 
could appropriately simply change its mind and rule that a hearing and appointment of 
counsel were not necessary. 
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required. The rule provides that: "[ajfter pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set 
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case" Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(j) 
(emphasis added) (addendum A). In appropriate cases, a district court may properly dispose 
of a post-conviction petition without ever holding any hearing. The district court in this case 
did not err by summarily dismissing the petition without holding any hearing, because no 
hearing was required. 
Petitioner was also not entitled to appointment of counsel. A petitioner has no 
constitutional right to counsel in a civil petition for post-conviction relief. See e.g. Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,94 S.Ct. 2437 (1974); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,107 S.Ct. 
1990 (1987); Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893,901 (7th Cir. 2000). However, if a petition 
is not summarily dismissed, the district court may decide to appoint pro bono counsel in 
certain cases. Since the petition was summarily dismissed in this case, the district court 
properly did not appoint counsel. 
Even if the petition had not been summarily dismissed, the district court would not 
have been required to appoint pro bono counsel. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
provides that: 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, 
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro 
bono basis. 
* * * 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the 
following factors: 
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require 
an evidentiary hearing; and 
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(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact 
that require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109 (emphasis added) (addendum B). The district court did not 
err in not appointing pro bono counsel, because the petition was properly summarily 
dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly summarily dismissed petitioner's second petition for post-
conviction relief because the issues raised were previously raised, or could have been raised, 
in the first petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was also properly dismissed 
because it was frivolous. The court of appeals properly affirmed the summary dismissal of 
the second petition. This Court should affirm the court of appeals decision. 
If this Court should find that the court of appeals decision was in error, and that 
summary dismissal of the second petition was improper, the remedy is to remand the matter 
back to the district court for appropriate proceedings under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act and Rule 65C, including providing the State with the opportunity to answer or respond 
to the petition at the district court level. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / £ cfcv of October, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
C/£c&^-< A4.X-
ERIN RILEY 
Assistant Attorney Genera 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Rule 65C UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 266 
When is a person in custody of governmental Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus 
authorities for purpose of exercise of state rem- proceedings, 34 ALR.4th 457. 
edy of habeas corpus—modern cases, 26 
AAJL4th 455. 
Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief. 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-
conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-
Conviction Remedies Act 
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing 
a petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the 
judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms 
provided by the court- The court may order a change of venue on its own motion 
if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of 
venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the 
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. 
Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not 
be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition 
shall state: 
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarcera-
tion; 
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and 
sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, 
together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the 
petitioner, 
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the 
petitioner's claim to relief; 
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for 
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and 
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of 
the appeal; 
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated 
in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case 
number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the 
results of the prior proceeding; and 
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered 
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time 
for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous 
post-conviction petition. 
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner 
shall attach to the petition: 
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allega-
tions; 
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court 
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case; 
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction 
or other civil proceeding that abjudicated the legality of the conviction or 
sentence; and 
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument 
or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in 
a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(0 Assignment On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign 
and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who 
sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the 
normal course. 
267 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65C 
(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge s hall review the 
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated 
in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its 
face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating 
either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its 
face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim 
shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal 
need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations 
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or 
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired 
prior to the filing of the petition. 
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading 
error or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall 
return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court 
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown. 
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial poet-
conviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(h) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that 
all or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall 
designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the 
clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail 
upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge tp a felony conviction or 
sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney 
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that 
prosecuted the petitioner. 
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these 
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the 
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the 
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition 
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response 
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time 
allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the 
motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered 
by the court. 
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are dosed, the court shall promptly set the 
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also 
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay 
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing 
conference, the court may: 
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to 
be presented at the evidentiary hearing. 
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at 
the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The 
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video 
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the 
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility 
where the petitioner is confined. 
(1) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed 
by the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good 
cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence 
that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order 
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either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or 
court records, 
(m) Orders; stay. 
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the 
petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be 
stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written 
notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new 
trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the 
stay of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will 
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the 
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or 
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to 
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that 
may be necessary and proper. 
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under 
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, 
the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that 
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department 
of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and sections 21-7-3 through 21-7-4.7 govern 
the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the 
amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs. 
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be 
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of 
Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
(Added effective July 1, 1996.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule 
replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It 
governs proceedings challenging a conviction or 
sentence, regardless whether the claim relates 
to an original commitment, a commitment for 
violation of probation, or a sentence other than 
commitment Claims relating to the terms or 
conditions of confinement are governed by 
paragraph (b) of the Rule 65B. This rule, as a 
general matter, simplifies the pleading require-
ments and contains two significant changes 
from procedure under the former rule. First, 
the paragraph requires the clerk of court to 
assign post-conviction relief to the judge who 
sentenced the petitioner if that judge is avail-
able. Second, the rule allows the court to dis-
miss frivolous claims before any answer or 
other response is required. This provision is 
patterned after the federal practice pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2254. The advisory committee 
adopted the summary procedures set forth as a 
means of balancing the requirements of fair-
ness and due process on the one hand against 
the public's interest in the efficient adjudication 
of the enormous volume of post-conviction relief 
cases. 
The requirement in paragraph (1) for a deter-
mination that discovery is necessary to discover 
relevant evidence that is likely to be admissible 
at an evidentiary hearing is a higher standard 
than is normally used in determining motions 
for discovery. 
Addendum B 
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 78-35a-104 
Section 
Preclusion of relief - Excep- 78-35*-108. Effect of granting relief - No-
tion, tics. 
Statute of limitation* for post- 78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel, 
conviction relief. 78-35a-110. Appeal - Jurisdiction. 
PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
78-35*101* Short title. 
This act shall be known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies Act." 
History: C. 1963, 7846a-101, enacted by Effective Dates. - Lawe 1996, ch. 235 
L. 1986, ch* 288, f 1. became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
Compiler's Notes. - As enacted, this chap- Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25. 
ter did not contain a Part 2. 
78-35a-102« Replacement of prior remedies 
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who 
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has 
exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as 
provided in Subsection (2). Procedural provisions for filing and commencement 
of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) This chapter doee not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or 
sentence for a criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure; or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
History? C 1868, 7M8e>188» saeeted by became tractive on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
L. 1686, ek. 3 3 M 8. Utah Const, Art VT. Sec 25. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 236 
78-35a-10& Applicability - Effect on petit ions. 
Except for the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107, this 
chapter applies only to poet-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1, 
1996. 
rilsiiMji C 1868, 78-86e>106, sascitsH by became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
L» 1966, efc. 886, | S. Utah Const, Art VT, Sec 25. 
Rflbetfv* Dstee. - Laws 1996, ch. 236 
78-35a-104. Ground* for relief - Retroactivity of rule. 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has 
been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the 
district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or 
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
Section 
78-35a-106. 
78-35a-107. 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation 
of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which 
the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was 
revoked in an unlawful manner, 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to 
vacate the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the 
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the 
evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction 
proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that 
was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered 
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could 
have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the 
sentence received. 
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule 
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or 
Utah Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be 
governed by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity. 
History: C. 1963, 7$-36a*104, enacted by became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
L. 199C ch. 235,1 4. Utah Con*., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Eflbethr* Date* - Laws 1996, ch. 235 
78-35a-105, Burden of proof. 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence the facta necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The 
respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to 
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
History: C. 1963* 7S-35a-106, enacted by became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
L. 199C eh. 235, | 5. Utah Comt., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Eflbethr* Date*. - Laws 1996, ch. 235 
78-35*106. Preclusion of relief - Exception. 
( D A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground 
that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
fb) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
i d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction 
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for 
post-conviction relief; or 
< e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
12) Notwithstanding Subsection (1XO, a person may be eligible for relief on 
a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
History: C. 1963, 78-36*-106, enacted by became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
L. 1996, ch. 236, « 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Date*. - Laws 1996, ch. 236 
78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for post-conviction re-
lief. 
( D A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year 
after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of 
the following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment 
of conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction 
over the case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah 
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ 
of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the 
entry of the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for 
writ of certiorari is filed; or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition 
is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse 
a petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations. 
(4) Sections 78-12-36 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period 
established in this section. 
History: C. 1963, 78-U-S1.1, eoaeted by L. 
1996, ch. 82, | U renumbered by L. 1996, 
ch. 235, | 7. 
Repeals and Realise fmsuts — Laws 
1995, ch 82, i 1 repeals former 178-12-31.1, ss 
enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 133, | 1, setting s 
three-month tuns limit on the right to petition 
for a habeas corpus writ, and enacts the present 
section, effective May 1, 1996. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29,1996, renumbered this 
section, which formerly appeared ss J 78-12* 
31.1; added Subsection (4), redesignating 
former Subsection (4) as (3); deleted former 
Subeections (3) and (5) concerning applicability 
to tune limitations and motions to correct a 
sentence; in Subsections (1) and (2) deleted 
"pursuant to Rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure" after "entitled to relief, and in 
Subsection (2) deleted *in a petition for post-
conviction relief* after "cause of action." 
Croee-Referencee. - Extraordinary relief. 
Rule 65B, U.R.C.P. 
78-35a-108. Effect of granting relief - Notice. 
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either 
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or 
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or 
sentencing proceeding as appropriate. 
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be 
stayed for five days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give 
written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will 
pursue a new trial or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no 
action. 
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time 
during the stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift 
the stay and deliver the order to the custodian of the petitioner. 
(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence 
the petitioner, the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to 
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters 
that may be necessary. 
History: C. 1963, 7S-35*-106, enacted by became tfftctm on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
L. 1996, ch* 286,1 S. Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25. 
Effective Dates. - LAWS 1996, ch. 235 
78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, 
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis. 
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not 
be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section* 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the 
following factors: 
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require 
an evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that 
require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective 
cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition. 
78-35a-110- Appeal — Jurisdiction. 
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for 
post-conviction relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3. 
History: C. 1968, 7S-S6a-110, enacted by bscams effective on April 29,1996, pursusnt to 
L. 1996, ch. 3SS, | 10. Utah Co rut., Art VI, Sec. 25. 
Efleetire Dales. - Law* 1996, ch. 236 
Addendum C 
7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS 
CASE NUMBER 911701048 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-5-404.1 - SEX ABUSE CHILD 
2nd Degree Felony Plea: July 07,1992 Guilty 
Disposition: July 07,1992 {Guilty Plea} 
Charge 2 - 76-5-404.1(2) - AGGRAVATED SEX ABUSE OF A CHILD 
1 st Degree Felony Plea: July 07, 1992 Guilty 
Disposition: July 07, 1992 {Guilty Plea} 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
BRUCE K. HALLJDAY 
PARTIES 
Defendant - LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS 
READING, PA 19604 
Plaintiff- STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: DAVID A BLACKWELL 
Represented by: MARY L. MANLEY 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS 
Offense tracking number: 578911 
Date of Birth: February 16,1965 
Law Enforcement Agency: Emery Co Sheriff 
Prosecuting Agency: EMERY COUNTY 
Violation Date: March 01,1990 EMERY COUNTY 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
PROCEEDINGS 
10-29-91 Information filed 
10-29-91 Filed: AMENDED INFORMATION julieqw 
10-29-91 Filed: BIND OVER ORDER julieqw 
12-16-91 Filed: THIRD AMENDED INFORMATION julieqw 
08-28-92 Filed judgment: JUDGMENT - SIGNED BY JUDGE BOYD BUNNELL julieqw 
Judge bhallida 
Signed July 07, 1992 
08-22-96 Filed order: ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND COMMITMENT TO 
UTAH STATE PRISON julieqw 
Judge bhallida 
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Signed August 21,1996 
11 -04-96 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEAL julieqw 
11 -04-96 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY julieqw 
11-21 -96 Filed: COPY OF LETTER FROM COURT OF APPEALS julieqw 
11 -26-96 Filed: MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL julieqw 
12-04-96 Filed: COPY OF MOTION WITH JUDGE'S NOTE AT BOTTOM julieqw 
12-04-96 Filed: NOTICE OF HEARING julieqw 
12-12-96 Filed: REQUEST FOR COPIES julieqw 
12-12-96 Filed order: ORDER TO PRODUCE julieqw 
Judge bhallida 
Signed December 04,1996 
12-12-96 Filed: ORDER OF DISMISSAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS julieqw 
01-22-97 Minute Entry-Motion julieqw 
Judge: BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: JULIE WINN 
Defendant 
Tape Number: 0334 Tape Count: 3301 
HEARING 
TAPE: 0334 COUNT: 3301 
Motion for Court Appointed Counsel. The Court informed the 
defendant that because of the allegations in the Petition, it 
prevented the Court from appointed the public defender, David 
Allred. The State addressed the Court regarding the responsibility 
of 
the County to pay for counsel for the defendant on post conviction 
motions. The Court will allow the State 15 days to respond to the 
petition of the defendant and time for setting an evidentiary 
hearing. 
01-22-97 Minute Entry - Motion julieqw 
Judge: BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: JULIE WINN 
Prosecutor: MARY L. MANLEY 
Defendant 
Tape Number: 0334 Tape Count: 3301 
HEARING 
TIME: 9:05 a Counsel for the State addressed the Court in 
regards to the County's responsibility to provide the defendant 
with counsel for post-conviction matters. 
TIME: 9:10 a The Court will allow that State 15 days to respond 
to the Petition regarding counsel and time for setting an 
Printed: 10/08/02 13:07:35 Page 2 
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evidentiary hearing. 
TIME: 9:00 a The defendant presented the Court with a Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief. The Court accepted and reviewed said 
petition. 
01-22-97 Minute Entry - Motion julieqw 
Judge: BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: JULIE WINN 
Prosecutor: MARY L. MANLEY 
Defendant 
Audio 
Tape Number: 0334 Tape Count: 3301 
HEARING 
The defendant presented the Court with a Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief. The Court accepted the Petition and reviewed 
the same. 
Because of the allegations in the Petition, the Court is unable to 
appointed the public defender. The State addressed the Court in 
regards to the County's responsible to provide counsel on 
post-conviction motions. 
The Court will allow the State 15 days to respond to the Petition 
regarding counsel and time for setting an evidentiary hearing. 
01-24-97 Filed: remittitur from court of appeals - order of dismissal julieqw 
02-21-97 Filed: Motion to Set for Hearing on Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief wendid 
01-26-98 Filed: Memorandum Decision - Utah Court of Appeals 
08-07-98 Filed: Remittur 
10-27-98 Filed: Motion of Discovery 
05-19-99 Filed: Transcript of Hearing 7-7-92 
05-19-99 Filed: Transcript of Hearing 9-26-94 
05-19-99 Filed: Transcript of Hearing 8-20-96 
05-19-99 Filed: Transcript of Hearing 1-22-97 
05-09-01 Filed order: Amended Judgment 
Judge bhallida 
Signed May 07, 2001 
05-09-01 Filed order: Order on Order to Show Cause 
Judge bhallida 
Signed May 07, 2001 
05-16-01 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court 
julieqw 
wendid 
wendid 
wendid 
wendid 
wendid 
julieqw 
wendid 
julieqw 
julieqw 
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Addendum D 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
LARRY L. HUTCHINGS, : 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant:. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
: Civil No. 970700008 
The Court, having reviewed Petitioner Larry L. K 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the above-entitle 
and having reviewed the proceedings wherein the Plaintiff w 
m violation of his probation, now concludes as follows. 
1. Petitioner's claim that his probation revcca' 
in an unlawful manner is not justified by the proceedings 
The claims appear to be specious and frivolous upon thei. 
Any claim of inappropriateness of timeliness of the filing 
service of same need be made at the time of appearance s 
subsequently at this late date. 
2. The claim of Petitioner of meffectivene 
counsel is not substantiated bv anv factual allegations but 
192 
^ 
the Petitioner's conclusions that the Petitioner was unable to 
communicate with his attorney and a claimed error on the part of 
tne attorney in not reviewing the case history, again, a conclusion 
not substantiated by any factual allegations made by the Petitioner 
herein. 
Based thereon, the Court concludes that the Petition is 
SDecicus and frivolous and herebv denies same. 
Due to the foregoing decision, the Court concludes that 
Plaintiff's Motion to Grant Relief filed herein on May 27th as well 
as his Motion for Order to Show Cause filed herein on July 2nd are 
frivolous and are nereby denied, 
DATED this «=*/ day of , 1997 
3*UCE K. HALLxDAY\ 
District Court Judae 
19:3 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the r day of fWtiSr 1997, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Larry L. Hutchings 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Mary L. Manley 
Deputy Emery County Attorney 
P.O. Box 249 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
Angela Micklos 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Addendum E 
r i L C U 
JAN 2 3 1998 
OOURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
Larry L. Hutchings, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 970479-CA 
F I L E D 
(January 23, 1998) 
Seventh District, Castle Dale Department 
The Honorable Bruce K. Halliday 
Attorneys: Larry L. Hutchings, Draper, Appellant Pro Se 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM; 
Hutchings appeals the trial courtfs dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief- We affirm. 
In an earlier appeal, Case No. 960726-CA, Hutchings 
contested the trial court's order revoking his probation and 
claimed that his counsel was ineffective. That appeal was 
dismissed after Hutchings failed to file a docketing statement. 
In the subject petition, Hutchings attempts to contest the same 
issues--the probation revocation and the effectiveness of his 
counsel. 
Even if we pass over the procedural difficulty presented by 
the dismissal of the prior appeal and reach the merits of 
Hutchinge'a arguments, they would fail. It is undisputed that on 
June 2, 1994, the State filed a motion for order to show cause 
and an affidavit in support alleging probation violations by 
Hutchings and that on December 16, 1994, the State filed a motion 
for warrant of arrest and an affidavit in support. Hutchings 
and/or his attorney were/was given copies of these documents and 
of the court's resulting orders and thereby received written 
notice of the nature of the allegations against Hutchings and of 
the pendency of enforcement actions in the trial court requiring 
him to respond, Hutchings and/or his attorney appeared at all of 
the hearings concerning his probation violations/ further 
evidence that they/he received proper notice. At the September 
1994 hearing, Hutchings's attorney conceded that Hutchings had 
violated his probation when he requested additional time for 
Hutchings to enroll in counseling, a condition of his probation, 
and at the August 1995 hearing, Hutchings admitted to two 
probation violations which led to the second order revoking his 
probation. Moreover, the filing of the affidavits by the State 
alleging probation violations, the trial court's Issuance of 
orders to show cause and a warrant tolled Hutchings's probation 
period and, thus, it did not expire on July 7, 1995, as Hutchings 
argues. Saa Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9) (b) (1992), 
We agree with the trial court that Hutchings's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is not supported by any 
evidence. Hutchings makes broad assertions about his counsel's 
actions, but fails to offer specific factual support for his 
claim or to meet the requirements of Strickland v. Washington. 
46S U.S. S68, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed 2d 674 (1984). 
Accordingly, the trial court's order dismissing Hutchings's 
petition for po3t-conviction relief is affirmed. 
370479-CA 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of January, 1998, a true and 
correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in the 
United States mail to: 
Larry L. Hutchings 
#25435 
PO Box 250 
Draper UT 84020 
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was 
deposited in the United States mail to the judge listed below: 
Honorable Bruce K. Kalliday 
Seventh District Court 
PO Box 907 
Castle Dale UT 84513 
TRIAL COURT: Seventh District, Castle Dale Dept., #970700008 
APPEALS CASE NO.: 970479-CA 
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Addendum P 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Larry L. Hutchings, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
FILED 
MAR 23 1998 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 970479-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme. 
This matter is before the court on Hutchingsfs petition for 
rehearing by which he argues that in our January 23, 1998, 
memorandum decision we improperly relied upon the dismissal of 
his earlier appeal and improperly concluded that his probation 
did not automatically expire on July 7, 1995. We reject these 
arguments. 
Although we mentioned the fact that Hutchingsfs earlier 
appeal, Case No. 96Q726-CA, was dismissed for failure to file a 
docketing statement and not on the merits, we did not rely upon 
this dismissal as dispositive of his claims in the subject 
appeal. 
Hutchingsfs appeal involved the interpretation of the 1992 
version of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9)(b). According to £he 1992 
version of the statute, the filing of affidavits by the State 
alleging probation violations, the trial court's issuance of 
orders to show cause and a warrant before July 7, 1995, tolled 
his probation period. The cases upon which Hutchings's relies 
for his argument that his probation automatically expired on July 
7, 1995, interpret earlier and different versions of that statute 
and are therefore not controlling in his case. State v. Moya, 
815 P.2d 1312 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) and State v. Green. 757 P.2d 
462, 464 (Utah 1988) interpret the 1984 version of the statute 
which did not contain the subject tolling provision. In both 
Moya and Green, the State did not file its first affidavit in 
support of order to show cause until after the original probation 
period had expired. Smith v. Cook. 803, P. 2d 788 (Utah 1990) 
interprets the 1981 version of the statute which did not contain 
the subject tolling provision. In Cook, the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that "because Cook was not given notice of the 
revocati ^ n proceedings prior to the expiration of his probation," 
the tria court lacked the authority to revoke his probation 
250 
after it automatically expired pursuant to the subject statute. 
803 P.2d at 793. In the subject case, the affidavit, order to 
show cause, and warrant were filed before Hutchings's original 
probation period expired. We also considered and rejected 
Hutchings's claim concerning notice. At the first order to show 
cause hearing in July 1994, Hutchings•s counsel stated that he 
was appearing at Hutchings1s request. Counsel and/or Hutchings 
appeared at all subsequent hearings, evidence that the State gave 
appropriate notice. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is 
denied as Hutchings has failed to present any points of law or 
fact which were overlooked or misapprehended in our January 23, 
1998, memorandum decision. 
Dated t hi s^%! J day of March, 1998. 
FOR THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on March 23, 1998, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
Larry L. Hutchings 
#25435 
PO Box 250 
Draper UT 84020 
Dated this March 23, 1998. 
By JSLUIOLJM 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 970479-CA 
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Addendum G 
r 
FILED 
DEC 7 (999 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
 fc . 
"C, 
— OOOOO — 
Larry L. Hutchings, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. Case No. 991006-SC 
State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent. (\^\O^OC? ' 
Order 
This matter is before the court upon a petition for 
extraordinary writ filed on November 10, 1999. A response to the 
petition was filed by the State of Utah on November 17, 1999. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 20(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure the petition and supporting motions are 
transferred to the Seventh Judicial District Court for post-
conviction proceedings under Rule 65(c) of Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
For The Court: 
/2esmJa.A #9? 
Dated Pat H. Bartholomew 
Clerk of the Court 
37! 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on December 2,1999, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
was deposited in the United States mail to the party(ies) listed below: 
LARRY L. HUTCHINGS 
#25435 
PO BOX 250 
DRAPER UT 84020 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand delivered to a personal 
representative of the following office to be delivered to the party(ies) listed below: 
LAURA B. DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160E300S6THFL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the trial court listed below: 
SEVENTH DISTRICT, CASTLE DALE 
ATTN: APPEALS CLERK 
85 E MAIN ST 
PO BOX 635 
CASTLE DALE UT 84513 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 991006-SC 
SEVENTH DISTRICT, CASTLE DALE, 911701048 
Addendum H 
FIL:D 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UT AH 
OCT Z 0 2000 
coM j T^Mef y 
J 
[ L A R R Y L. HUTCHINGS 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Respondent, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND j 
ORDER in re 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
Case No.: 990700187 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
Petitioner filed a an Extraordinary Writ directly with the Supreme Court for the State of Utah 
on November 10,1999. The petition contains extraordinarily long claims and has attached thereto 
appendices numbering in excess of 306 pages, (if petitioner's index is to be believed). He has filed 
a Request for Appointment of Attorney, and the Court has attempted to review the foregoing. In 
addition, the Court reviewed the entry of plea in the underlying matter before Judge Boyd Bunnell, 
as well as the admissions of violations alleged in an Order to Show Cause, which brought the 
respondent before the Court and resulted in his sentence to incarceration in the Utah State Prison. 
From the Court's review, I conclude that the Petition For Extraordinary Writ is frivolous and time 
expended by the county attorney in reviewing the documents, the attorney general in reviewing the 
documents when filed at the Supreme Court level, as well as this Court has been unnecessary. 
The hearing at which the defendant admitted, by and through his attorney Mr. David Allred, 
to the violation of the terms of his probation, was held in open Court. The defendant was present. 
The defendant's attorney, Mr. David Allred, is a legal defender for Emery County, and was appointed 
to represent the petitioner in the Order To Show Cause proceedings. There is no question that the 
petitioner had, in fact, violated the terms of his probation, had failed to report, and had not 
successfully completed the sexual abuse counseling judgement issued by Judge Bunnell. Based upon 
all of the foregoing his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to the Utah State Prison under 
the original judgement. The review of the petitioner's pleadings, which the Court has made herein, 
seems to indicate that the Order on Order To Show Cause sent the defendant to the Utah State Prison 
for incarceration pursuant to the original judgement. The Court has reviewed the original judgement 
and the original judgement did not accurately reflect the judge's actions since the pleas taken were 
43J 
to two 2nd degree felonies, not a second degree and a lrt degree felony as reflected in the written 
judgement. The sentence, however, was accurately reflected in the judgement, to wit, not less than 
one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years for each count to run concurrently. Based upon the 
above, and the Court's assumption that the original judgement was attached to the Order To Show 
Cause Judgement, I conclude that there have been no improprieties in the sentencing of the defendant 
under the original judgment of the Court and the Order to Show Cause Judgement. 
This Court is struck by the volume of pleadings which the petitioner has filed. In reviewing 
same, I note that the Court of Appeals in responding to this same petitioner's prayer for relief to that 
Court, also found no justification in the petitioner's petition. The petitioner continues to abuse the 
legal system relative to requests for relief and has most recently been referred to the Trial Court for 
a determination as to whether counsel should be appointed to represent the respondent. The Court 
having reviewed, as far as is reasonably possibly, the pleadings concludes that the claims made by the 
defendant are frivolous, and have also been dealt with by the Appellate Court as well as the Trial 
Court in the disposition which has been made of this matter. 
Based thereon, I decline to appoint counsel to represent the defendant and find the Petition 
frivolous and order thi^ sanae dismissed. 
Dated this /jr day of October, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
43 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
DECISION AND ORDER IN RE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT by depositing same in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid or hand delivering to the following: 
Larry L. Hutchings State Of Utah 
#25435, Utah State Prison c/o Brent Langston 
PO Box 250 Deputy County Attorney 
Draper, UT 84020 Emery County Courthouse 
Castle Dale, UT 84513 
DATED this 3Cfo day of October, 2000. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Addendum I 
Not Reported in P.2d 
2001UTApp95 
(Cite as: 2001 WL 327741 (Utah App.)) 
H 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Larry L. HUTCHINGS, Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee. 
No. 20000994-CA. 
March 22, 2001. 
Larry L. Hutchings, Draper, pro se. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS, and ORME, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Hutchings was convicted in 1992 following 
guilty pleas to two second degree felony counts of 
Sexual Abuse of a Child. His probation was 
revoked in 1996. Based upon Hutchings' failure to 
file a docketing statement, this court dismissed a 
direct appeal from the probation revocation (Case 
No. 960726-CA) on December 9, 1996. Hutchings 
then filed his first petition for post- conviction relief 
in January of 1997, challenging the probation 
revocation on the merits and on procedural grounds. 
This court affirmed the district court's dismissal of 
that petition. See Hutchings v. State, No. 
970479-CA, slip op. (Utah CtApp. Jan. 23, 1998). 
Although noting that the trial court's dismissal of 
the direct appeal raising essentially the same issues 
was appropriate, this court concluded that the 
claims in the petition for extraordinary relief also 
failed on the merits. In November of 1999, 
Hutchings filed a second petition for extraordinary 
writ directly in the Utah Supreme Court, stating that 
he had been unable to obtain relief from either the 
district court or this court. After the supreme court's 
transferred the petition to district court, the petition 
was dismissed and this appeal followed. 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code 
Copr. © West 2002 No ( 
Page i 
Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -110 (1996), is dispositive. 
Section 78-35a-106(1) precludes relief on any 
ground that was "raised or addressed ... on appeal" 
or "could have been but was not raised on appeal" 
or "was raised or addressed in any previous request 
for post- conviction relief or could have been, but 
was not raised in a previous request for 
post-conviction relief." 
The claims Hutchings raised in his second petition 
were either raised and addressed, or could have 
been raised, in either the direct appeal from the 
probation revocation, the first petition for 
post-conviction relief, or the appeal from dismissal 
of that petition. The second petition repeats claims 
raised and addressed in prior proceedings including 
a claim that his probation terminated in July of 
1995, and claims of procedural irregularities in the 
revocation proceedings. The remaining claims 
could have been raised in the prior proceedings. 
Given the preclusive effect of section 78-35a-106, 
Hutchings may not continue to obtain review of 
claims that were either raised or could have been 
raised on direct appeal or in previous 
post-conviction proceedings and the appeal 
therefrom. 
The district court considered and rejected a claim 
that the sentence imposed was illegal. See Utah 
R.Crim.P. 22(e). The district court concluded that 
the judgment incorrectly recited that Hutchings 
entered a guilty plea to one first degree felony and 
one second degree felony, rather than guilty pleas to 
two second degree felonies. The sentence, however, 
correctly reflected the conviction for two second 
degree felonies, as did subsequent proceedings on 
probation revocation. The trial court did not err in 
concluding the sentence was not illegal. 
Hutchings contends this court cannot act until the 
Utah Supreme Court transfers the appeal to this 
court. The appeal, however, is within the original 
jurisdiction of this court under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2Xf)0996), and no transfer from the 
supreme court is necessary to vest this court with 
jurisdiction. 
*2 We affirm the dismissal. 
2001 WL 327741 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 95 
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v. 
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Addendum K 
IN THE SUPREME COURT CF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Larry L. Hutchings, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
No. 20010419-SC 
20C0C994-CA 
9907001S7 
ORDER 
The court grants Mr, Hutchings' motion to appoint counsel to 
represent him on appeal. The court has appointed Mr. D. Matthew 
Masccn and requested that he file a brief on behalf of Mr. 
Hutchings* The court also, by this order, requests that the 
State participate in this appeal and file a brief in response. 
FOR THE COURT: 
.#1, aoo^ 
ftichard C. Howe, 
Chief Justice 
